

Summary Political Behaviour HS20

Overview of the subjects and the connections

Part I: Party System Formation, Change, and Their Individual-Level Roots

- Cleavages and the Formation of West European Party Systems
 - o Social groups and politics
 - o The Lipset-Rokkan (1967) model: social class, religion, urban-rural
 - o Characteristics of conflicts rooted in social structure
- Micro Foundations
 - o Values and ideology
 - o Preferences, attitudes, and grievances
- Political Change Since the 1970s and Protest Politics
 - o The emergence of “New Social Movements”
 - o Theories of social movements: How they come into being and why people join them
- Translating Movements into Party Systems
 - o New parties, new dimensions of conflict
 - o Which social groups underpin new conflicts?
- Cultural Conflicts and the Radical Populist Right
 - o What underlies the mobilization of the radical populist right?
 - o The example of France
- Identities and Groups
 - o Identity politics and models of identity
 - o Linking identities to cleavages, attitudes, and grievances
 - o Examples of how identity influences political behavior: polarization; immigration; conflict
- Personality and Politics
 - o Authoritarianism
 - o System preservation
 - o Closed mindedness

Part II: Democratic Representation

- Perceptions and Accountability
 - o Accountability and issue signaling
 - o Correct perception as a precondition
 - o Examples and reasons for flawed perceptions: Motivated reasoning, media environment
 - o Deliberative politics as corrective
- Populism and representation
 - o How has the rise of the SVP affected representation?
 - o Polarization and representation
 - o The role of populism in voting for the radical populist right and left
- Non-Programmatic Linkages and Representation
 - o Alternatives to ideology: Clientelistic and charismatic mobilization
 - o Examples: Peronism and Kirchnerism in Argentina & Chavismo in Venezuela
 - o Implications for representation

VL1 What is political behaviour?

In this course we are going to look at political behaviour from different perspectives. On the one hand we are looking at the Macro and Meso level by looking at sociological theories and approaches. There the focus will lie on culture, structure and groups. On the other hand, we are looking at the Micro level by looking at psychological theories and approaches. We might look at the same topics from different perspectives.

Learning objectives:

- 1. To obtain an overview of the most important micro, meso, and macro theories of political behavior.
- 2. To sense the kinds of research questions that preoccupy researchers in the field of political behaviour.
- 3. To acquire an understanding of the most important research methods in research about political behaviour.
- 4. To grasp how modern-day phenomena such as radical right populism, alt facts, and polarization work.

Definition Political Behaviour in this course: Mass political behaviour consists of those actions of ordinary citizens aimed at influencing political outcomes. In CH e.g. citizens often get the chance to influence political outcomes. Political behaviour takes place in three different arenas:

- **1. Electoral arena:** Here we are talking about elections and votes.
 - o **Turnout:** Why is it that certain individuals decide to participate in a vote or an election? Why do others not participate?
 - o **Vote choice:** How do the people make up their minds? Why do they vote for or against something or someone?
- **2. Protest arena:** also called the unconventional arena. People protesting for change or against something on the streets. That arena is often very consequential.
- **3. Interest group arena:** Especially public interest groups.

How do we structure the relationship between different concepts?

- **Funnel of causality:** We try to explain political behaviour behaviours and therefore we use this concept. The funnel of causality orders the various causal factors in terms of their proximity to political behaviour. It was originally proposed by Campbell et al. (1960). We propose a variant that suits the needs of this course
 - o **Economic and Structures/Culture and Norms**
 - o **Identities/Interests/Values:** Identities reflect the psychological sense of belonging to a specific group. Interests are the material stakes that a person has. Values reflect desired goals or end states.
 - o **Attitudes/Beliefs:** Attitudes are a learned tendency toward the evaluation of an object. Beliefs are the idea that some proposition about the world is true
- Steps to structure the answer of a question (E.g. Who votes for Trump?)
 - o Choose the perspective to analyse a question. E.g. the economic perspective, social structures and culture.
 - o In these macro structures we then define the Identities, Interests and Values. These shape attitudes and beliefs. E.g. Automobile worker in the rustbelt.
 - o And the Attitudes and Beliefs than shape a specific behaviour.

- In all these questions we should also consider the context. Like this it is easier to see the differences. Possible variables of this context could for example be:
 - o Electoral system
 - o Number and nature of parties
 - o Parliamentary vs. presidential
- Therefore, a comparative approach is very useful. In this course we will mainly focus on Western Europe and the Americas.

VL2 social groups and party systems: The classical European model


- Extensions
 - o How social groups are formed
 - Based on Lipset and Rokkan
 - o Explaining the relative importance of cleavages
 - Which cleavages become represented in a society?
 - Which cleavage is the most important to an individual?
 - o Cleavages at the micro level:
 - How do people with multiple attachments decide who to vote for?

The concept of cleavages

- It is a structuralist concept which is concerned about the social structural roots of politics. But at the same time, it's a concept that is connected to the individual and the societal level. The cleavage concept tries to answer the following question:
 - o What are the conditions for social conflict in society to be represented in politics and to be mirrored in the party system?
- **Definition:** a cleavage is a durable politicised conflict.
- **Lipset and Rokkan's (1990) [1967] approach:** in their approach they are explaining the formation of the West European party systems.

Steps to structure the answer to political behaviour: the funnel of causality

The concept of cleavages focusses on the social divisions and how they manifest themselves in politics. There are also many potential conflicts that don't show up in the party system.



The structuralist approach

- Rational choice is an individualistic perspective
- Structuralism as “group theory” (Hall & Taylor 1996): This approach tries to take a step back and explain where these individual perspectives come from and how they are embedded in society. Focus is on individuals as part of a group they belong to.
 - o Focus on interactions, networks
 - o Social identities are crucial for group formation
 - o Compatible with culturalism but not the same. E.g. working-class culture would be a intermediate.
- In electoral studies: Question how social factors shape electoral outcomes.
- What is specific about conflicts rooted in social structure
 - o These conflicts are usually quite stable and decide how one reacts to new conflicts
 - o Funnel of causality: link to group identity

Structural conflicts

- Anchored in social structure: description of society and based on the relationships between individuals and groups. This is a relational concept, everybody is also defined by the relationship to the others.
 - o **Positions:** Worker, owner, catholic, non-religious, rural or urban resident
 - o **Positions = roles:** shared understandings of what a worker, owner, or religious person is
 - o **Roles** relate to counter-roles (e.g. workers and owner are antagonistically related)
- Political sociology: How do social antagonisms become political conflicts?

From social to political conflict

- Multiple potential political conflicts: class, religious, racial, ethnic, linguistic, national, or gender – and many more. Also within an Individual or a group.
- Which ones become politicized?
 - o Structuralism: macro-processes of modernization as critical junctures. These are triggers which cause grievances (Misstände) and put certain groups in a better or worse situation. This creates potential for social groups to become politically involved.
 - E.g. Nation building, industrialization (Lipset & Rokkan)
 - E.g. Secularization, educational revolution, value change, post-industrial society E.g. European integration, globalization

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) The formation of West European party system

- What is a party system?
 - o A configuration of parties and a system of interactions (Sartori 1976).
- Two critical junctures explain make-up and differences between party systems. This is based on a lot of theory and history.
 - o National revolution
 - o Industrial revolution
- The basic assumption are that Parties represent social groups and the party system that emerged out of these groups depend heavily on how the ally with each other.
 - o The configuration of party systems depends on alliances
 - o These alliances can be predicted or explained
- Ultimate aim is explaining the presence and relative strength of different cleavages

The national revolution - The first critical juncture:

- **The centre-periphery cleavage:** Nation-building triggers territorial opposition
 - Culture of the centre vs. local cultures: Many of these conflicts are about schooling. What is taught in schools/national history, languages, religions etc?
 - **Historical examples:** Regional parties in Scotland, Canada, Spain (Basques and Catalans) oppose national or liberal parties
 - **Contemporary examples:** Lega Nord, Lega dei Ticinesi, various Flemish Belgian parties
- **Church-state cleavage:** A cultural antagonism:
 - Secularizing impact of the French revolution
 - Centralizing nation-state (Liberals) vs. historical privileges of the church (education extremely important! Who is responsible for education?)
 - Produces a great deal of variance
 - Formation of Christian Democratic parties (Austria, Germany, Switzerland; later in Italy and France)

The industrial revolution - The second critical juncture:

New conflicts after cultural “standardization” and consolidation of state borders. Industrialization and extension of franchise leads to two economic cleavages. These are cross-local conflicts.

- **Primary vs. secondary sector:** this one also has a local component
 - Protectionism (peasants) vs. free trade (industry and commerce)
 - Parties: Agrarian and peasant’s parties (e.g., BGB/SVP in Switzerland) or the liberals
- **The class cleavage**
 - Pits the industrial bourgeoisie against the working class. They were in the same sector but had very different preferences (e.g. social security).
 - Conflicts over political participation (being able to vote: CH & USA as exceptions), distribution, economic and social rights
 - Parties: Socialist parties, Social Democracy, Workers’ Parties
 - Communist parties due to split within the left after the Russian revolution (e.g., Italy, France, Spain)

How social groups are formed: Distinctive working-class movements

- **Sociological concept of closure:** There are two factors which shape closure:
 - Social mobility closure
 - How are the possibilities of leaving the group? Openness of society to upward mobility through education. The easier it is to change/leave a social class the weaker the identity of the classes are.
—> Exit, voice, and loyalty, Hirschman 1970, Bartolini 2005
 - Contrast between USA (historically high mobility) & Europe (historically low)
 - Interaction closure
 - Who people interact with (Max Weber, Anthony Giddens, John Stephens, Sheldon Stryker)
- **Political concept of closure:** What is the role of parties?
 - Workers’ parties attempt to create subcultures that are relevant for their members: party press, organizations, sports clubs, unions, newspapers etc.
 - Like this they create boundaries to others and the voters/members stay loyal to them. Christian parties also adapt (early 20th Century)

- The social construction of boundaries
 - Reinforcing social identities, nourishing loyalties and establishing cultures: “(...) the values and views characteristic of different classes as they are historically formed through autonomous organisation (...)” (Rueschemeyer, Huber, Stephens 1992: 50-51)

The relative importance of cleavages

How do we explain the presence and relative importance of different cleavages?

- Lipset and Rokkan (1990) stress Alliances between social groups and Sequential mobilization
 - Social groups tend to remain loyal to the party that initially mobilized them
 - Not all voters are “available” for mobilization!
 - Prior cleavages impinge on strength and social composition subsequent cleavages
- The social composition of left-wing electorates in the 1950s/1960s
 - Is the working class actually voting for the working-class-party? In Scandinavia and GB yes and in Switzerland this is not really the case.
 - This is the case, because in Scandinavian countries and GB there was no religious cleavage. Therefore, most workers have not yet been mobilized and are open/available for the left-wing mobilization. In CH many voters had already been mobilized by other parties.

What is the role of the Individuals?

Voters have multiple group attachments and How do cross-pressured voters decide which party to vote for?

Elements of a Cleavage	Social structure	Social identity	Political organization
	Positions in social structure (class, education, religion, milieu, etc.)	Group identification (social identity)	Political loyalties (party identification)

- From the left to the right the process of closure is happening

Problem: Every Individual belongs to different groups and has different group attachments. Which one is the one we are going to be loyal to?

- The relative salience of group attachments is crucial in determining action (Stryker 1980)

Symbolic interactionalism (Stryker 1980)

- “Self” and “society” are inherently linked:
 - o The preferences we have as Individuals enrol on the societal level.
- Social structure is a relational concept
 - o Roles are related to counter-roles
 - o Each individual has multiple identities and they are arranged in a salience hierarchy
 - How do we decide which one is more important? This can be linked to the interactions we have. We tend to interact with people from the same social group.
- Interaction as a social pattern:
 - o Who you interact with is shaped by social structure (-> social groups)
 - Social closure in the cleavage account
 - Interaction shapes identity salience
 - o Cross-pressured individuals vote according to their most salient identity
 - This is shaped by interactions and social structures
 - o Structural account: Identities are socially rooted

Conflict between parties reinforces social identities

This are the three elements of a cleavage:





Figure 4.3. Electoral instability over time.

Bartolini & Mair (1990): Stability of the class cleavage into the 1980s

- **Total volatility:** the overall share of voters who switch parties (e.g. switch from GPS to SP)
- **Cleavage volatility:** voters who switch between the left and the right blocks. This volatility goes down over time in Europe.

→ This stability is quite extraordinary considering that the social structure has changed so dramatically over time in Europe.

VL3 Values and Ideologies


How do we study values and Ideology?

- Key methodologies : Cultural artefacts, (Participant) Observation or Sample survey
- Sample surveys are very common in political science
 - o **The idea in theory:** Every citizen has an a priori known, non-zero probability of being selected into the sample. E.g., simple random sampling
 - o The problem areas:
 - **Coverage error:** Frame to generate the sample does not match the target population. E.g. telephone books as a sample frame, but this is bias because a group is systematically excluded and therefore systematically different. Literary Digest poll relied on telephone book, but at the time many in rural places did not have a phone (predictions of US elections with Roosevelt)
 - **Nonresponse error:** Selected units refuse to do the survey. A massive problem with response rates being often much less than 50%. Another problem with this is, that usually politically interested people are more likely to participate.
- Asking questions in surveys
 - o **The idea:** Values are mental constructs. Therefore, it is difficult to ask questions, because they elicit them by asking specific questions that shed light on the values.
 - o **Problem areas:**
 - Do people hold values? Is there anything to guide their responses?
 - **Unreliability:** people might respond differently if we ask them the same question twice, even though their values did not change.
 - This is due to bias such as
 - o Social desirability
 - o Method effects
 - o Mode effects (online, telephone, face-to-face etc.)

Three Micro Perspectives on values:

- **Rokeach and value hierarchy:** The enduring belief that a certain end state is personally or socially preferable to another end-state. This is called the concept of terminal values.
 - o **Terminal values:** are focussed on an end-state/goals. Either an Individual (e.g. I want to be rich) or a social end-state (e.g. a healthy environment)
 - o **Value are stable:** over the course of a lifetime values form and usually stay stable
 - o **Values are broadly defined:** they are about something you want to achieve for yourself or society. That's why they are considered so important for political behaviour.
 - o **Values form a hierarchy:** The most highly ranked values are the most relevant for political behaviour.
- **Ingelhart:** there are certain values that usually go together and come from value change.
 - o **Value change:** These clusters are present because of value change.
 - Younger generations grew up in affluence. Their basic needs were taken care of. As a result, younger individuals are committed to postmaterialist values such as autonomy and self-expression.
 - Generational replacement results in a silent revolution, because the older generations die. A transformation away from materialist values happens.

- **Value clusters:** According to him there are three clusters:
 - **Materialist:** Want to maintain the order and want to have price control. They are very concerned about their material/economic well-being.
 - **Mixed:** They are concerned about thing of both other clusters. E.g. they want to maintain order and Free speech.
 - **Postmaterialist:** For them the most desirable things are Participation and Free speech.
- **Schwartz 10 universal values.** This is sort of an update from Rokeach. These values are:
 - Self-direction, Stimulation (e.g. creativity), Hedonism (e.g. richness, pleasure), Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity, Tradition, Benevolence and Universalism.




- All these values can be put on a two-dimensional scale.
- This two-dimensional structure exists around the globe. And can be found in every society.
- Conservation vs Openness to change
- Self-Enhancement vs Self-Transcendence
- It can also be understood from evolutionary and functional perspectives. What is needed for societies to survive? All needed.

Macro Perspectives on Values

- **Almond & Verba - Civic Culture:** Here values play an important role. They did surveys in different parts of the world and then came up with three types of civic culture:
 - **Parochial:** Here the central governments are very far away of people's everyday lives. As a result, the perceived relevance and awareness of that government is low, and people feel that they don't really have an influence on the government. They often perceive the government as a negative thing.
 - **Subject:** Is in general very similar to the parochial type, but here the perceived relevance of the government is high. The realise that the government has a big influence on their lives. But they don't think that they can change something.
 - **Participant:** Here the perceived relevance, the awareness and the efficacy are high. Therefore, the Norms to participate are strong in contrast to the other two types.
- **Welzel – Freedom Rising:**
 - There has been a rising quest for emancipation around the globe, which manifests itself in
 - Freedom of choice & Equality of opportunity
 - Expansion of rights as a function of expanding resources.
 - Emancipative values such as:
 - Autonomy: has to do with views on lifestyle choices people make
 - Equality
 - Choice: in politics
 - Voice: independence and imagination
 - These have (to some extend) to do with Schwartz's clusters of openness to change and self-enhancement.

- Is there such a thing as an emancipatory cluster that has emerged?
 - Yes. The four emancipative values are hanging together more and more as the technological advancement increases.
- Emancipative values in relationship to secularisation
 - The more secular a society becomes; the more emancipatory values are being embraced.
- What increases the well-being in a society?



A first take on Ideology:

- What is so important about ideology?
 - Ideologies organize political ideals and ideas.
 - They are a set of beliefs and values held by an actor that define that actor's normative direction.
 - They also are the transformation of experience into ideas about what is and what ought to be (Antoine Destutt de Tracy, coined the concept in the late 18th century).
 - They are an essential part of the structure of party systems.
 - They are often used to think about representation
- Ideologies and values
 - Rokeach saw ideologies as value bundles.
 - **Value pluralism** is the idea that actors hold different values.
 - Ideologies encapsulate this pluralism and build a narrative of value priorities and their translation into policies.
 - For Rokeach, the core ideologies of the 20th century were about two values:
 - **Equality & Freedom**
- Typologies of the main Ideologies of the 20th century (Rokeach)
 - **Communism**: Prioritizes Equality not Freedom
 - **Socialism**: Prioritizes Both
 - **Conservatism**: Prioritizes Freedom
 - **Fascism**: Prioritizes neither

VL4 Preferences, attitudes, and grievances – What Citizens Want

Introduction:

- Two weeks ago, we discussed classic cleavages and their politization.
- Last week, we discussed how political culture shapes values.
- This week, we discuss attitudes, preferences, and grievances. These are relatively close to the political behaviour we want to predict.
- Next week, we consider one kind of behaviour—protest behaviour.

three concepts important for understanding behaviour:

Attitudes (psychology wording): Attitudes are a learned tendency toward the evaluation of an object. They are much more specific than values and therefore, much closer to the behaviour. We use attitudes to predict behaviour.

- The object of the attitude can be almost anything:
 - o A policy or issue (e.g., progressive taxation), A person (e.g., Donald Trump), A group (e.g., immigrants), An event (e.g., strikes in the public sector), A period (e.g., the 1950s were much better than the 21st century)
- Attitudes vs. values:
 - o **Value:** I want society to be more equal
 - o **Attitude:** I support progressive taxation
- **Attitudes as latent constructs:** We cannot directly observe an attitude. We derive it from some form of observable behaviour. Most commonly this is response behaviour in surveys.
 - o E.g., Progressive taxation shifts the burden to the strongest shoulders.
 - 1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neutral 4. Agree 5. Strongly agree

Public opinion: as an aggregation over people's attitudes

- It is typically measured by aggregating responses from surveys:
 - o % agree minus, % disagree
- In democracy, there is the presumption that elites heed public opinion. This is one way to think of representation. But is there a such thing as "a public opinion"?
- **Critique by Schumpeter** describes the concept of competitive Elitism. In his view you want to minimize the impact citizens have on decision making.
 - o **competitive Elitism:** "Thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyses in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again."
- **Empirical evidence:** Do people's responses truly reflect any attitude at all?
 - o There was a Panel study, where people were asked about their opinions regarding federal housing. Over several years people did not at all answer consistently. How do we interpret this?
 - There was no major event, which could have triggered a change in attitudes
 - If there is an attitude and that attitude does not change, should not people's responses remain constant over time?
 - If we find inconsistencies that cannot be explained, should not we assume that citizens do not have an attitude toward an issue, group, person, etc.?
 - Perhaps they do not even know what the survey question asks about

Converse: Non-Attitudes

- On any given issue, vast numbers of citizens do not have an attitude. Instead of admitting to this by responding “don’t know,” they make up a survey response.
- Since there is nothing to the response, the next time they’ll make up a completely different answer. The result is response instability.

Fazio’s attitude model

- Attitude = Object + Evaluation
 - o E.g. Trump is the object and the evaluation is negative.
 - o Link between the evaluation can be strong, weak, non-existent.
 - o When the link is strong, then thinking about the object without also experiencing the evaluation is nearly impossible.
 - o With a non-attitude, there is no link: no evaluation comes to mind when thinking about the object.

Attenuation Bias: Response instability occurs as well when the responses contain a great deal of measurement error. Perhaps survey researchers just ask very bad questions that cause much confusion and result in large amounts of error.

Ambivalence:

- Perhaps citizens are conflicted about issues.
 - o They know a lot but some of it causes them to favour and some of it to oppose a policy.
 - o That is, there are opposing considerations, causing citizens to be ambivalent.
- How Ambivalence Generates Instability (Feldmann & Zaller)
 - o **Survey response model:** When confronted with a survey question, respondents sample considerations. They do this quickly with a top-of-the-head (first thing that comes to their mind) responding.
 - o What comes to mind first depends on many factors:
 - Question order
 - Question framing
 - Response attributes
 - o In ambivalent individuals, pro considerations may come to mind at one time, while anti considerations dominate at another time. Therefore, there is no guarantee for consistent answers over time.
- What could be driving ambivalence?
 - o 1. Conflict within values, identities, or interests as drivers of attitudes:
 - E.g. Limited government vs. equality
 - o 2. Conflict between values, identities, and interests:
 - E.g. I like equality, but I think the policy helps an outgroup I dislike

Issue Publics:

- Real attitudes can be found in issue publics. An issue public is a group that cares deeply about a particular issue:
 - o E.g. Pro-life movement in the USA, 2nd amendment groups in the USA, Anti-maskers
- These individuals tend to respond consistently. The issue also tends to shape their political behaviour:
 - o Protesting, Single issue voting, Lobbying

Preferences (economics):

- Differences between preferences and attitudes
 - o Relational vs. Non-relational
 - o **Utility** for object A compared to object B vs **Liking/disliking** toward a single object
 - o Latent: cannot be directly observed (this is the same)
 - o Measurement through **preference** questions vs. Measurement through **attitude** questions
- Preferences and Utility
 - o Utility (U) = enjoyment or use from consuming a good.
 - o It is a metric that allows for the comparison of alternatives.
 - o Rational choice theory argues that A is preferred to B if $U_A > U_B$
- Utility and Risk
 - o Alternative A = CHF20 for sure.
 - o Alternative B = CHF40 with probability .5 and CHF0 with probability .5.
 - Expected Values are the same (20 CHF).
 - o With marginally declining utility, a decision maker prefers A to B.
 - o **Risk aversion** = the preference for a certain alternative over a gamble with the same expected value.
- **Preferences are all about utility comparisons**
 - o Anything can go into this utility equation, e.g. altruism can also be considered

Grievances (political psychology and sociology):

- Grievance = a complaint.
- They reflect unhappiness with one's lot and are often driven by one's economic situation
- Can be based on:
 - o Absolute indicators
 - o A comparison with others, an aspiration level, or the past
- A major impetus for protest (see next week)

Comparative perspective:

- Imagine some reference point, e.g., aspiration level.
 - o If things are better than the reference, one operates in the domain of gains.
 - o If they are worse, then one experiences a loss.
- According to prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1979)
 - o People are risk averse in the domain of gains
 - o People are risk seeking in the domain of losses
- Implications of this theory:
 - o Citizens in the domain of losses may be more inclined to engage in potentially costly activities such as protest.
 - o They may be more inclined to vote against the political establishment and vote for populist alternatives. Therefore, Populists try to push people in the domain of loss (e.g. Trump 2016)

VL5 New Social Movements and protest politics

Learning objectives:

- You know what defines a social movement (as compared to the institutionalized politics)
- Provide the background for the mobilization around cultural issues in Europe and the US
- Insight into theories of social movement formation:
 - o What does it take for a movement to come into being?
 - You are able to apply these theories to real-world examples of contemporary social movements

Movement politics and arenas of participation

- Three arenas of participation
 - o **Electoral arena:** also called conventional arena. Examples for this arena would be voting or campaigning.
 - Kitschelt & Rehm 2017: choosing policymakers
 - o **Public arena:** also called unconventional arena. Examples for this arena would be voicing demands or protesting. The name public arena reflects the normalization of social movements and protests in politics, that's why it is not called unconventional anymore.
 - Kitschelt & Rehm 2017: public expression of demands (preferences) are signalized to the political authorities and the rest of society in a non-institutionalized way.
 - o **Interest group arena:** also called Lobbying. Examples for this arena would be people supporting interest groups and lobbying.
 - Kitschelt & Rehm 2017: communicating preferences to policymakers in the legislative and executive branch
- Differences between movements and interest groups
 - o Weak formal organization and loose membership criteria
 - o Movements cannot negotiate – they have nothing to offer in return for concessions (Offe 1985: 830). They can only offer to stop protesting when they demands are met.
 - o Organizations can be part of a movement network, but the movement is broader

The context: The New Social Movements of the 1970s and the boundaries of the political

- Distinctive from “old” labour movement. They were no longer concerned with materialist issues but with many cultural questions. And they found new forms of political action called movement politics.
- Most important New Social Movements (NSM):
 - o Women's movement, antidiscrimination, gay rights, environmentalist movement (including an anti-nuclear branch), peace movement, solidarity with the third world, squatter movement
- Civil rights movement in the US
 - o They defined a whole new range of peaceful and non-violent forms to protest such as sit ins, demonstrations etc.
 - o In terms of political change, they accomplished the end of segregation, diminished discrimination to a certain extent, it provided voting rights for African Americans throughout the country, but the inequality remained.

- What constitutes a social movement?
 - **A group of people with a conflictual orientation towards an opponent.** It is a collective challenge to the status quo. Usually, a government is involved/challenged by the movement (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001:5)
 - Another word for social movement is “Contentious politics”.
 - Sustained mobilization and interaction is necessary to call them a social movement (Klandermans 2001: 269)
 - **A movement is rooted in common beliefs, goals and in a feeling of collective identity and solidarity.** To overcome the collective action problem, they need to feel as if they belong to a common group. They need to have a collective identity and feel solidarity with the cause of others. This is a process which is reinforced by the movement.
 - Beliefs: Values & ideology (week 3)
 - Goals: Preferences (week 4)
 - **A repertoire of collective actions**, that is different from other (institutionalized) arenas in politics.
- Offe (1985): Challenging the boundaries of institutional politics
 - **“Old politics”**: traditional cleavages with economic and religious issues.
 - **“New politics”**: based on post-materialistic (Inglehart 1971, 1977) or emancipative values (Welzel 2014).
 - **Universalistic values and aims**: New there is a strong focus on quality in terms of how individuals choose to live their life (
 - **“Identity politics”**: describes the new focus, but is a bit misleading, because there are also older forms of identity politics such as nationalism.
- Warren (1999): What is political?
 - two necessary and sufficient attributes:
 - **Conflict** over means, ends, or the domain of collective action
 - **Power**: At least one group/party seeks to resolve a problem through resort to power – and wants to arrive at collectively binding decisions.
 - E.g. two people need to decide what movie to watch. If one person is your boss and threatens you to fire you if you don’t choose his film it is a political situation, because there is power involved.
 - How do political issues, which are part of the suppressed politics become part of the domain of politics?

What is political?
(Warren 1999)

		Power	
		no	yes
Conflict	yes	Decisions not collectively binding Not political (exit is possible)	Decisions that become collectively binding Domain of politics
	no	Not political (consensus)	Suppressed politics

The area of politics in the 1960s
(adapted from Warren 1999)

		Power			
		Decisions not collectively binding	Decisions that become collectively binding through:		
			Cultural power	Economic power	Coercive power
Conflict	yes	Not political (exit is possible)	Domain of politics		
			Church-state conflict	Distributive politics	State-centered politics
	no	Not political (consensus)	Gender- and identity politics	Suppressed Politics	

What is political today?
(Warren 1999)

		Power			
		Decisions not collectively binding	Decisions that become collectively binding through:		
			Cultural power	Economic power	Coercive power
Conflict	yes	Not political (exit is possible)	Domain of politics		
			Politics of gender, religion, identity, etc.	Distributive politics	State-centered politics
	no	Not political (consensus)	Suppressed Politics (not contested due to vulnerability or hegemony)		

- Political situation in the 60's (second picture)
 - o Decisions can become collectively binding through
 - **Cultural power:** Influences the way we see the world and the alternatives we see. This was characterised through the church-state conflict. With issues such as abortion. The gender and identity movements had been suppressed up to this point and therefore, they are in the lower half and marked green.
 - **Economic power:** Has to do with distributive politics.
 - **Coercive power:** state centred politics and things such as war, policing etc.
- Political situation today (third picture):
 - o Decisions can become collectively binding through
 - **Cultural power:** Politics of gender, religion, identity etc.
 - **Economic power:** distributive politics
 - **Coercive power:** State-centred politics

The New Social Movements of the 1970's and 1980's

- Have their sources in two domains
 - o **1968 revolution:** Driven by the radicals, student movement which normalized fighting for specific issues like women's rights
 - o **Local citizen actions** communities organized from the bottom, grassroots movements. More concerned about local issues, but they came together with other groups.
- Value change as a driver of the New Social Movements
 - o **Welzel 2013:** Change from materialist values to post-materialist values. To look at the value changes he looks at Cohort differences as an indicator of value change over time (chap. 2, p. 91). You can see that younger people have more secular values and are less shaped by religion and have stronger emancipative values. Therefore, **Emancipative values are a driver of collective action** especially under the younger generations (chap. 7).

Are the New Social Movements still around?

- Some examples would be the Fridays for future movement, the MeToo movement, BlackLivesMatter etc.
 - o Social Movements are still around, but they peaked at a certain point in time (in the late 70's / early 80's). Therefore, scholars collected data on the number of protest events and the number of participants. In the mid 2000's mobilization was especially low, but in recent years this has surely increased.

Theories of social movements


- There are three general theories
 - o The classical model / grievances model
 - o The resources mobilization theory / Resources model
 - o Political opportunity structure model / Political process / opportunity structure model

- **The classical model** before the 1970's:
 - **Cleavage model:** grievances and relative deprivation (People feel like they are not receiving their fair share of resources or recognition etc.) are the drivers of Social Movement formation.
 - **Criticism against this model by Klandeman (2001):**
 - This model assumes, that people know where they stand in society.
 - **Symbolic interactionism:** "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" People just need to feel mistreated to take action.
 - Do people make the right comparison?
 - This depends on hegemony. Suppressed Politics are not contested to if there is vulnerability or hegemony.
 - **Grievances** are ubiquitous: This concept is not sufficiently explained, because there are much more grievances than politicised issues. Grievances are a necessary, but not a sufficient cause for social movements.
 - **Collective action frames:** Klanderamans (2001): tries to put a more realistic view on grievances through this concept. Persuasive communication raises awareness and makes shared (=social) identities salient.
 - **E.g. Fridays for future:** They highlight that the action is urgent and that politicians fail to act. And they highlight the generational component, where the young generation has to live with the consequences that the older generation caused. With this discourse they make the collective action more persuasive. These are group forming mechanisms which are important.
- **Resource mobilization theory:**
 - Emerged as a critique on the classical model
 - Agency-oriented: Focuses on internal life of the movement. Resources are needed to feed a movement
 - **Internal resources:** Political entrepreneurs and Organization (informal, NGOs, etc.)
 - **External resources:** solidarity with cause



- Similarities with the resources model of participation
 - Internal life and Brady, Verba, and Schlozman's (1994) findings
 - Here structure matters but it is not mentioned explicitly
 - **Internal resources:** Interest (≠alienated), time, skills, money and Networks
 - **Political entrepreneurs and organization:** together with external resources
→ Mobilization

- Link to structuralism
 - Brady et al. (1995): Protest as most demanding form of participation
 - Strong education effect (interest and skills)
 - Resources are not evenly distributed in society
 - Some groups are more likely to mobilize than others
 - But lack of resources can be overcome by social closure and organization. E.g. important for Class and religious cleavages
 - A bias explaining which grievances are mobilized into which arenas?
- **Political opportunity structure model:**
 - a synthesis of the previous two



MacAdam (1982): Explaining the Civil Rights movement

- Explain development, peak, and decline of movement as a process
 - Tries not only to describe the rise but also the fall of movements / process as a whole
 - Why did the movement peak between 1961 and 1965?
- Grievance models and resource mobilization cannot explain timing of insurgency
 - Internal organization building
 - Black church
 - Black colleges
 - National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP)
 - these three groups played a very important role
 - Interaction with other actors
- Explaining the decline of the movement after 1968
 - Organizational decline, disunity in the movement
 - Protest shifts from South to North – growing polarization
 - Conservative backlash (Nixon, Reagan) based on new issues such as security and inflation. These Republicans tried to mobilize other issues which were perceived as threats (civil and economic)
 - New progressive issues such as Vietnam war and ecology
 - Democrats retreat from mobilizing black vote
 - Radicalization and repression

The European New Social Movements in a long-term perspective: protest events and number of participants

- Why did protest erupt in the late 1970's?
 - o **Structural change:** Emancipative value change
 - o **Resources:** University students form core: networks, skills, etc.
 - o **Action repertoire:** Diffused from Civil Rights movement in US (sit-ins, occupation of universities, nonviolent disobedience)
 - o **Triggering events:** Vietnam war, nuclear confrontation in Europe
 - o **Diffusion:**
- Application on Fridays for Future / Extinction Rebellion
 - o **Grievance:** urgency of change, also part of the discourse
 - o **Collective action frame:** generational component
 - o **Resources:** education (Sommer et al. 2019), networks, supporting organizations, alliance partners (UN General Secretary Antonio Guterres)
 - o **Charismatic leadership:** Greta Thunberg
 - o **Media attention, diffusion**
 - o **Applications of the theories:** e.g. civil rights movements in the USA

Why people join social movements? (Klandermans 2001)

- Instrumentality: desire for change (grievance, rational choice element)
- Collective action frame: Diffused via personal networks and persuasive communication. It is a cultural element which links the individual to the group?
 - o Helps overcome the collective action dilemma
 - Successful mobilization provides incentives for participation (Kurer et al. 2019)
 - Recognize what change you want, coming to share the goals of a movement
 - Identifying with the group: this is open to mobilization from above.
- Identities and their relative salience (see Week 2 on Cleavages)
 - o Individuals identify to varying degrees with the group in question (women, ethnic group, environmentalists vs. working class, etc.)
- Identities are motivational: identities compete with one another for expression. Their relative importance decides which one "wins"

VL6: New Left in the Party System

How did the ideas of the social movements move into politics?

How do we explain the long-term persistence of historical cleavages?

- Lipset and Rokkan (1990, last sentence): “The voter does not just react to immediate issues but is caught in a historically given constellations of diffuse options for the system as a whole” (p. 138)
 - Parties shape the way we think about politics
 - Voters interpret new issues through the lens of politics as they know it. This makes it difficult for new issues to establish themselves in the existing political framework.
 - **Historical institutionalism:** critical juncture followed by “positive feedback” (Thelen 1999, Pierson 2000)
 - **Socialisation:** In “normal politics”, new generations of voters are socialized into an established structure of competition.
 - **Reinforcing cleavages:** there are two cleavages in the same dimension, and they reinforce themselves. E.g. Left (is Pro state intervention and secular), right: Pro-market and conservative/religious).
 - **Cross-cutting cleavages:** here the left right dimension says nothing about the degree of secularisation. Here there are usually several parties.
- Conflict and group appeals reproduce alignments between social groups and political parties. For much of the 20th century cleavage volatility went down (Bartolini & Mair 1990).

What happens when new conflicts come up?

- **“Normal politics”:** Issues that don’t fit the dominant structure of conflict are “organized out of politics” (Schattschneider 1960). It is potentially dangerous for a party to adapt a new issue which could divide their basis. Therefore, it is easier to avoid issues.
- **Social movements introduce innovation** (last week): If these issues become important and salient, existing parties have to comment on them and take a position.
 - But: New parties and those that have little to lose have incentives to politicize new issues.
 - As long as the traditional parties are strong, the new ones don’t really have a chance. Except if these traditional issues are not that important anymore.
- **Dealignment:** Alignments between social groups and parties become weaker (Dalton, Flanagan, Beck 1984)
 - Social structure changes (e.g., secularization, shrinking of the working class)
 - Social groups reorient themselves
 - Both create opportunities for political actors
- The dealignment hypothesis: Parties no longer represent specific social groups
 - Evidence from Franklin (1992: 387): Decreasing explanatory power of class and religion on vote choice between left and right parties
 - Social categories and identities are less important in most European countries
- **Realignment:** New alignments are formed based on new conflicts

Dealignment or Realignment?

- Unsettled questions after the weakening of traditional cleavages:
 - o Are alignments based on specific issue preferences or enduring dimensions (similar to the historical cleavages)?
 - o Are alignments anchored in social structure or do voters make up their minds on their own?
 - o Value change as a new critical juncture?
- Mobilization of new social movements as a sign of cleavage change

The changing nature of conflict in West European party systems

- Green parties form a New Left and adopt the goals of the New Social Movements
- Social Democratic parties are under pressure
 - o transformation from “old left” to New Left parties, where universalistic values got important
 - o Differences between countries. In France and Switzerland, the Left became a new left. The SPD still has quite of a traditional Left profile.
- **Kitschelt (1994): two dimensions of conflict**
 - o Economic: state vs. market (the old class cleavage)
 - o Cultural value dimension: libertarian vs. authoritarian
- In which countries does the Left win and in which does it loose?
 - o Left wins in the Netherlands, Switzerland, West Germany
 - o Left loses in Austria, France and Great Britain

What is the structural basis of the new cultural divide?

- Value change as a new critical juncture?
Differing interpretations of the origins of value change
 - o Unprecedented prosperity and material security in the post-war era (Inglehart 1984, Dalton et al. 1984)
 - o The “educational revolution” (Allardt 1968, Kriesi 1999 and many others)
 - o Economic and cultural modernization (Kitschelt 1994) – affluence, education, sector
 - Combination of the two previous ones
 - terms: Post-materialistic/emancipative/libertarian/ universalistic values
 - o There is evidence for both positions
- Measuring attitudes with a mass-level survey (France 1978)
 - o Libertarian vs authoritarian dimension: questions in a survey (examples)
 - Are you proud to be French? (measures an attitude)
 - Should people be allowed to take birth-control pills before reaching the legal age? (measures an attitude)
 - Should schools teach discipline or critical awareness? (measures a preference)
 - Should children be sent to catechetical instruction? (measures an attitude)
- Kriesi 1999: The educational revolution has two conflicts
 - o Vertical: “winners” vs. “losers” of modernization
 - o Horizontal: Differences within group of “winners”!
 - How can we explain who participated in the New Social Movements?
 - Higher education has two effects
 - Emancipatory value change
 - Frustration due to status inconsistency

The antagonism between managers and socio-cultural specialists

- Managers
 - o Part of administrative hierarchies (public or private)
 - o Organizational work logic
 - Defend the status quo
 - o Are substantially less likely to vote for the new left than the mean
- Socio-cultural specialists
 - o Rely on their skills and expertise only
 - Value/fight for work autonomy
 - o Client-interactive work logic therefore, they experience human diversity
 - Hold anti-authoritarian and emancipatory values
 - o Are substantially less likely to vote for the centre right
- The antagonism plays out on the Libertarian / Cultural dimension
- The two groups have about the same size and are two antagonists
- Working class less likely to vote for the new left (realignment)
- Differentiating of the classes matters! But do these groups see themselves as a group?

How real are these categories?

- Results from a survey in Switzerland (2018)
- We asked about identification with 17 groups:
 - o “How close do you feel to the following groups? By ‘close’ we mean, who is likely to resemble you with regard to their attitudes, circumstances, and sentiments?”
- Vertical differentiations: Education (people with a university degree, with apprenticeship), income
- Identifications with groups based on work logic related to class membership:
 - o “People who work with and for other human beings”
 - Socio-cultural specialists feel close (yes, they do)
 - o “People who manufacture a concrete product”
 - Technical specialists, production workers (yes, they do)
 - o There seem to be aspects of a cleavage there

How much closure is there in the middle-class divide?

- Special distribution of the party votes:
 - o Kreis 4/5 as a stronghold of the New Left
 - If you live there you will likely meet people with this (the same) view
 - o Zollikon as a stronghold of the Liberals
 - Here you will likely interact with people of the Liberal party
 - o Oerlikon you have both
 - Closure might also be high in smaller districts within Oerlikon
 - o Regensdorf is a stronghold of the SVP
 - +43% voting right wing populist

VL7 Cultural conflicts and the rise of the radical populist right

Learning objectives

- The concepts of dealignment and realignment
 - o How they relate to the manual working class
- You have an idea of the dual transformation of political space in Western Europe
 - o Based on the reading and the lecture
- You are able to
 - o Position explanations for radical populist right voting in the funnel of causality ►
 - o Assess these explanations critically

Old and new conflicts

- **Dealignment:** Alignments between social groups and parties become weaker (last week)
 - o Social structure changes (e.g., secularization, shrinking of the working class), or...
 - o the behaviour of social groups changes
- **Realignment:** New alignments are formed based on new conflicts
 - o Last week: realignment in the middle class
 - o Today: Realignment of the working class
- Conflict and group appeals reproduce alignments between social groups and political parties

Evans, Tilley, de Graaf (2013, 2017): Ideological convergence and dealignment

- Class continues to matter
 - o Life chances (working class is still worse off than other classes), identity important
 - o Preferences along the economic state-market dimension (pro redistribution)
- Party appeals are relevant
 - o Left-right ideological polarization
 - Convergence: evidence, but strength depends on the data used
 - o Group appeals
 - Reinforcing social identities
 - E.g. the Labour Party in GB has been talking less and less about the working class in their party manifestos.

The New Left shifts

on the economic dimension

- New Left parties push for reforms of the welfare state.
- From status preserving welfare states to ...
 - o social investment
 - o social policies targeted towards new social risks: single parents, elderly women, etc.
→ Universalism
- The Labour Party talks less about the working class but more about the poor in general
- While the traditional welfare state was tailor-made for the industrial working class

on the cultural dimension

- Cultural dimension
 - o Universalistic values: Free choice of lifestyles, women and minority rights (Kitschelt 1994)
- Evidence that Social Democratic parties' stances regarding cultural universalism matter for class voting

There has been a realignment of the middle class and a dealignment of the working class

- Now the working class has also realigned
- Where have they gone? They went to the radical right parties.
- How did this change happen?

Two transformations of cultural conflicts (From religion to...)

- **The first transformation:** emergence of the libertarian-universalistic pole. Bottom-up (New Social Movements).
- **The second transformation:** More top-down. Radical populist right parties politicize a different conception of community
 - o **Cultural differentialism** or ethnopluralism (Betz 2004, Betz & Johnson 2004; Antonio 2000): Idea that it is legitimate to preserve the culture. But here racism is present but sold in a new form.

The emergence of a radical right-wing populist party family


- Cultural differentialist frame diffused from Front National (now Rassemblement National) (Rydgren 2005)
 - o Programmatic convergence of right-wing populism
 - o Example of the Swiss People's Party (SVP): Week 11
- Two elements of traditionalist-communitarian ideology
 - o Rejection of libertarian/universalistic values of the New Left (Ignazi 1992, Inglehart & Norris 2019)
 - o Advocacy of a communitarian conception of community

The polarization of the cultural dimension in France

- New Left and populist right shift temporally proximate
- Socialist Mitterrand government enacts reforms
 - o Abolishment of the death penalty, regularization of illegal immigrants, limits on police prerogatives, gender equality
 - o Strong reaction to the breakthrough of the Front National in 1984: Founding of SOS Racisme, "adversarial strategy" towards FN (Meguid 2008)
- This also mobilized the opposition
- In France the mobilization of the left in the protest arena happens after the right wins in 1993.
 - o In the protest arena there is a dominance of the new left in France

What is the situation today in France? (2017 elections)

- Left graph: this is the situation we would expect in theory
- Right graph: the actual situation, attitudes of their electorate



Structural basis and its explanation

- The social basis of cultural preferences went as follows:
 - o declining political relevance of religion
 - o polarization based on education
 - o polarization based on class
- Explanation: with the funnel of causality
 - o What explains the vote are **attitude**. Specifically
 - Cultural liberalism, Immigration and European integration
 - Overall positions on cultural dimension
 - o What explains the vote are **campaigns** they
 - activate these attitudes and help to overcome ambivalence
 - o What explains the vote are **identities and value orientations**
 - Parties reinforce social identities (beginning of this lecture)
 - Networks and social closure. With who we act shapes our identities.
 - Sociological contribution/explanation
 - o What explains the vote is **political sociology**:
 - Focus of the cleavage perspective (and political sociology more generally)
 - Critical junctures/ grievances explaining the rise of the radical right?
 - Economic structure, social divisions and historical patterns

(All too) easy explanations for radical right voting (basically wrong explanations)

- Rising immigration?
 - o Radical right vote share is no simple reaction to levels of immigration (Dennison & Geddes 2019)
 - o Attitudes towards immigration tend to become more favourable since 1950s
 - o If perceptions matter, what drives these perceptions?
- Economic crisis?
 - o Pertinent only in Southern Europe

Where the same critical junctures in place as for the New Left transformation?

- Unprecedented prosperity and material security in the post-war era
 - o Generational differences (universalistic vs traditionalistic)
 - o Inglehart & Norris (2019) stand alone
- The “educational revolution”
 - o Differences according to education
 - o Massive evidence
 - o Compatible with various interpretations (economic, cultural, transnationalism)
 - o But what does that mean?

Are there new critical junctures such as Modernization and globalization?

- **Economic** modernization or globalization
 - o **Theory**: Increasing competition – winners and losers (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi et al. 2008)
 - o **Evidence**: Workers sectors exposed to international competition are not more likely to vote radical right
 - There is no such effect
 - Why would they not vote for the radical left? (F, NL, DK offer an radical left option)

- **Cultural** modernization
 - **Theory:** Success of the New Left in pushing for universalism
 - **Evidence:** New Left issues and anti-immigration attitudes are strongly related (inverse relation)
- **Political** globalization: supranational governance
 - Defence of the nation state and sovereignty
- Generally, there is a lot of evidence for the cultural and the political explanation, but not really for the economic one.

Why is it the working class that votes for this parties so strongly?

- The real “losers” of modernization don’t vote. They don’t have the resources to do so.
- Something about the working class
 - **Cultural attitudes**, not economic anxieties matter (Oesch 2008)
 - **Relative deprivation** (Elchardus and Spruyt 2012): perception of not getting what you deserve. Others take advantage of the state and you are somehow left out.
 - This perception is quite widely spread among the working-class
 - **Closure** matters: the radical right has become entrenched in the working-class milieu
 - France: The more family-members and friends are also in the working class, the more likely it becomes that a person votes for the Front national /rassemblement national
 - For working-class voters, culture is more important than economics
 - Average voter attitudes of the Front national are centre-left on economic issues. But their electorate is quite distributed on the economic dimension.
 - If economic issues would become more relevant again, this could be a problem for this party.

VL8: Identities and groups

What is social Identity? And Why US vs THEM is such a strong concept

Context

- The age of identity politics
 - o We live in an age of identity politics
 - o Examples:
 - Black Lives Matter
 - Nationalist politics
 - Xenophobia
 - o Why are appeals to identity so powerful?
 - o What are their consequences of these identity appeals?

Definition - Understanding the concept

- **Basic definition:** We all possess self-concepts—beliefs about who we are. Social identities reference those parts of our self- **concept that derive from group memberships.**
 - o Groups can be many things:
 - Ethnic and racial groups
 - Religious groups
 - Professional groups
 - National groups
 - Political groups
 - Classes
- Why are these groups so fundamental for our social identity?
 - o They satisfy a basic need that we all have as individuals. The following authors described this need:
 - **Volkan:** People have a fundamental need to think in terms of enemies and friends. In human history we have also seen that enemies are sometimes created.
 - **Tajfel and Turner:** Describe the functions of these need in an instrumental way. Our self-esteem derives from the group to which we belong. Positive self-esteem is an essential need
 - (Adler, is an author who established self-esteem as one of the most important drivers of humans)
- What do we need to talk about a social identity? 3 requirements:
 - o I. Self-categorization
 - I see myself as a member of the group
 - My group reflects who I am
 - o II. Sense of belonging
 - I feel involved in what is happening to my group
 - When someone attacks the group, it feels like a personal insult
 - o III. Positive affect
 - I am proud of my group
 - I am happy to be a member of the group
- How easy can identities be formed?
 - o Many identities have deep historical roots.
 - o However, psychologists have shown that identities can also be formed on the spot with the minimal group paradigm

- The minimal group paradigm
 - You build a group on an arbitrary, non-existing line between individuals
 - E.g. red caps vs blue caps were distributed randomly
 - People see themselves as a part of a group (red or blue)
- Group comparison
 - Distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup
 - Identity satisfied if Ingroup > Outgroup
 - Identity dissatisfied if Ingroup < Outgroup
 - Mechanisms behind this behaviour
 - Ingroup favouritism
 - Outgroup Derogation
 - Here people often start engaging in stereotypes
 - We stop looking at them as individuals

→ These behaviours can boost the own self-esteem

- What happens if people have a dissatisfied social identity? There are different strategies such as the following ones
 - Recategorization
 - You can start to think of yourself as an atypical member of this group (But this might weaken your identity)
 - It might be that this identity is quite important to you and therefore, you experience a lot of anger and/or anxiety

Consequences of this concept

- Identities do matter! They become really important in these areas
 - **Collective Action:** Identities can help to overcome free-riding problems and other collective phenomena such as the tragedy of the commons. They can help in collective action by
 - Moving beyond pure self-interest
 - Acting on behalf of the group Identities
 - **Political Perception:** Policies might not be evaluated objectively due to the social group identity. As we can see in Lavine, Johnson and Steenbergen (2012).
 - **Political Violence:** Just a few examples: The Troubles (in Northern Ireland), Rwanda, Balkans or the Holocaust. In this examples we see outgroup derogation work quite strongly.
- Studies on this subject
 - **Kramer and Brewer (1984)** about the Tragedy of the commons:
 - One experiment with a pool of resources. They told the young participants that they were sharing this pool of resources with other people who were not present, and they told them that the other people were old. Therefore, they made the contrast between young people (participants/ingroup) and old people (outgroup) salient.
 - They played multiple rounds and observed, that among male participants, high depletion levels—average take of between 7-8 points each round. This depletion is clearly attributable to the identity manipulation.
 - Question: Any parallels to phenomena that we observe now?
 - **Lavine, Johnson, and Steenbergen (2012)** How do partisans perceive political reality
 - Identities are partisan identities in the US (democrats and republicans). The then the question is: Do people actually perceive the reality (e.g. the success

of certain policies under an administration/president) of what it is or does the identity start getting into the way of these perceptions?

- One question was if unemployment got better, stayed the same or got worse under the Reagan presidency?
 - Reality: it got worse in the beginning but picked up again after some time in his presidency. So, it got better in the time of the survey.
 - 75% of the Republicans said that it got better, but only 39% of the Democrats realized that.
- Second question: had the federal deficit been reduced under the Clinton presidency?
 - Reality: the deficit has gotten better under his presidency.
 - 66% of Democrats said it got better and 55% of Republicans did so too. Therefore, there is still quite a difference between the perceptions.
- **Duckit and Sibley (2016)** come to a different solution/conclusion
 - They analysed the effect of personality on political behaviour. To do so, they use the five big personality traits. In Addition, they look at political groups in New Zealand.
 - Big five: Conscientiousness, Open-mindedness, Agreeableness, Neuroticism and Extroversion
 - Political groups: Right-wing authoritarianism, Social dominance orientation, national identities and Ethnic identities.
 - What are the causal pathways that lead to political behaviour?
 - From national Identity derives no specific political behaviour
 - Pathway from ethnic identity to political behaviour also weak
 - They conclude that identities might not be as important for political behaviour. What do we do with such a finding?
- Questions we should always ask ourselves when reading such papers
 - Scope conditions:
 - How typical is NZ? For the general phenomenon?
 - How good is the outcome variable for measuring identity effects?
 - Goals:
 - Is this paper primarily about finding identity effects? At the front of this study they are interested in the big five and not political behaviour.
 - Causal specification:
 - Why would identity come after personality?
 - Are there other causal stories that can be told?

Do people have multiple identities? And what are the consequences of this fact?

- People have multiple identities
 - Identities can reinforce each other:
 - e.g. swiss, SVP member and farmer
 - For a long time, society was organised in pillars and people were socialized in these (e.g. in the Netherlands until 1960's). Therefore, there is no conflict.
 - Conflicting identities
 - Two conflicting identities such as being catholic and a democrat (in the US) might be pulling in two very different directions. This can create a tension.
 - Superordinate Identities
 - E.g. Biden tried to create a superordinate identity by saying that he will govern as an American.

- These Superordinate identities can be used to overcome pathologies of other identities. E.g. Black and White voter are American voters.
- Finding from Kramer and Brewer (1984): When a common identity (instead of old vs. young) was created before the game was started, there was a massive reduction in the depletion of the common pool of resources. This effect gets stronger as time progresses. This effect can again only be observed with the male participants.

Addition to the US elections 2020

- What are the relevant identities in the US elections 2020?
 - Partisan identities
 - Identity of Trump supporters / Republicans is quite strong
 - This might have been underestimated in the predictions

VL9 Personality and Political Ideology

Situating of the theme

- Why do we study Ideology? And why do we study Personality?
 - o Last week, we saw how personality variables relate to identities and to political behaviour.
 - o We have also discussed how the ideological landscape in Europe (and elsewhere) has changed:
 - New left—green parties
 - New right—radical populist right parties
 - o In this lecture we connect the themes.
 - o Central question: How should we understand supporters of left and right ideologies?
- Different views on ideology
 - o I. Ideologies bundle a wide variety of issues—rational choice (Downs)
 - o II. Ideologies reflect value priorities—cultural perspective (Rokeach)
 - o III. Ideologies reflect psychological needs—personality and neuroscience perspective (today's lecture)

The big five

- **Definition of Personality:** Semi-permanent internal predispositions that cause people to behave in a particular manner across a variety of domains and that set them apart from each other.
 - o Semi-permanent: predispositions which don't change very easily.
 - o Internal: part of the human psyche, are measured by surveys
 - o Predispositions: can be observed in the behaviour of people
 - o Particular manner: there is a specific nature to this behaviour. Different personalities behave differently
 - o A variety of domains: personalities are not domain specific
- With these traits we would like to predict behaviour, but these are not directly linked to the behaviour. There are more so linked to needs that a person has.
- Authors who studied it
 - o General theory of personality by Costa & McCrae
 - o Precursor in Norman (1963):
 - Started with these kinds of theories. He discovered patterns in different persons traits. In particular he found five clusters of traits.
 - o General theory of personality by Costa & McCrae (1990's)
 - Tried to refine Norman's theory and find patterns and intercorrelations between different items. Some correlated so strongly that you could say that they had the same underlying factor.
 - o Based on factor analysis of itemsTherefore, they found five mostly uncorrelated factors and clearly distinguishable. The (big) five factors and their facets (behavioural manifestations are:
 - **Agreeableness:** Compassion, Humility (Bescheidenheit), Trustfulness
 - **Conscientiousness:** Industriousness (Fleiss), Orderliness, Self-Discipline
 - **Extraversion:** Assertiveness (Durchsetzungskraft), Gregariousness (Geselligkeit), Social Confidence
 - **Neuroticism:** Anxiety, Depression, Irritability (Reizbarkeit), Rumination (reifliche Überlegung)
 - **Openness:** Adventurousness, Idealism, Intellectualism

- Many Traits Have a Genetic Element
 - Jang, Livesley, and Vernon (1996) find that openness, in particular, has a strong genetic component. May be because of its connection to intelligence.
 - **Nature vs nurture:** debate which also has political implications
 - Nature can be studied with twin studies
 - When they have been separated at an early age, they had different nurturing circumstances, but the same nature/genetics.
 - There we can see which things have more of a natural/nurturing component
 - Why does this matter for political science?
 - Personality correlates with ideology.
 - The **conservative** (trying to preserve what there is) as anxious, disciplined, risk-averse: → **Conscientiousness**
 - Jaensch (1938) J-Type
 - Fromm (1947) hoarding type
 - Uncertainty-threat (1990's)
 - The **liberal** (about pursuing one's free choice and changing the world around one) as open-minded. → **Openness**
- Carney et al. (2008):
 - Liberals systematically score higher in Openness than Conservatives in all facets of Openness.
 - On the Conscientiousness dimension they score significantly less than Conservatives. Particularly in two of these facets: Achievement strive and order (against mess in general). Therefore, the journey might be more important to liberals in their education and for the Conservatives the degree is more important.
 - On the other personalities the evidence is not as clear.
- Personality and Populism:
 - **Bakker, Rooduijn, and Schumacher (2016):** argue that agreeableness correlates negatively with populist voting. Disagreeable personalities are more probable to vote for the populist party.
 - Low agreeableness means higher susceptibility to anti-establishment messaging.
 - Both left and right!
 - **Fatke (2019)** looks at data mainly in Germany and Great Britain (GB) and shows that
 - Low agreeableness means higher susceptibility to anti-establishment messaging as well
 - Neuroticism plays a role as well
 - Conscientiousness seems to play a role in Germany but not in GB
 - Therefore, context matters!
 - There is a personality basis for certain ideologies, but that is not the only explaining factor to describe the voting behaviour

Right-Wing Authoritarianism

- Developed to understand the appeal of a particular type of ideology—fascism.
 - o Adorno et al. (1950) *The Authoritarian Personality*.
 - Here the argument is not at all about genetics/nature, but more about nurture
 - F-Scale: name of the measurement instrument. The following traits were discussed and the first three are the relevant ones.
 - **Conventionalism***: there are conventions in a society and people should just adhere to these conventions. Psychological need is that the order should remain the way it is/has been.
 - **Authoritarian submission***: the willingness/desire to submit to an authority (not necessarily the government but also particular leaders such as religious leaders as an example).
 - **Authoritarian aggression***: the willingness to act against conventions, when the authority says so. E.g.
 - Anti-intraception (you don't like to think too long about something), Superstition and stereotype, Power and toughness, Destructiveness and cynicism (if all else fails, you can be destructive), Projectivity (world is a bad place and you need to be prepared to face it), Sex (authoritarians are often obsessed with sex and sexual morees?)
 - Some F-scale Items by Ray 1972

Insults to our honor are not always important enough to bother about.	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Sex crimes such as rape and attacks on children are signs of mental illness; such people belong in hospitals rather than in prisons.	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Most honest people admit to themselves that they have sometimes hated their parents.	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas but as they grow up, they ought to get over them and settle down.	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
What the young need most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel great love, gratitude and respect for his parents.	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

- Revival of such theories in the late 1980's with Altemeyer
 - o Altemeyer's RWA = right-wing authoritarianism.
 - A syndrome of three elements of the original F-scale.
 - Conventionalism
 - Authoritarian Submission
 - Authoritarian Aggression
 - Correlates negatively with openness.
 - o RWA Mechanisms
 - **Feldman & Stenner**: The perception of **threat** is important to explain the behaviour of RWA. If RWA's don't feel threatened, you might not distinguish them from a non RWA person. Therefore, the success of authoritarian leaders depends a lot on threats.

- RWA Effects
 - Voting behaviour
 - Support for punitive policies
 - Support for populists
 - Support for conspiracy theories (but only those implicating the political establishment)
- Is there such thing as Left Wing-Authoritarianism?
 - Altemeyer: Traditional finding says no.
 - Eysenck and others have argued that dogmatism exists on both sides but is more prevalent on the right.
 - Conway et al. (2017) argue there is LWA:
 - Parallel items to RWA—**questionable**
 - Focus on religious target groups—relevant in US but elsewhere?
- **Social Dominance Orientation SDO**
 - RWA correlates positively with SDO
 - SDO helps to explain opposition to policies that improve the lot of or extend rights to certain groups in society
 - Positive appraisal of HIERARCHY
 - Negative appraisal of EQUALITY
 - Is more a particular set of values than an personality

The neural Substrates of Ideology – the connection to the brain

- Liberal Brains vs Conservatives Brains
 - Liberals:
 - The volume of the anterior cingulate cortex is larger than in Conservatives
 - Increased functionality connectivity between dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the insula and putamen
 - Stronger resting state connectivity in the mirror-neuron system, linked to social and emotional abilities, including empathy
 - Conservatives:
 - The volume of the right amygdala is larger than in Liberals (amygdala deals with the perceptions of threat)
 - Larger grey matter volume in left insula
- Beyond Correlation
 - Chawke and Kanai (2016):
 - Use transcranial random noise stimulation to activate dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
 - Observe an increase in conservative values
 - Goal of the study was to assess the effect of messages; the increase occurs regardless of message

Take home messages

- Ideologies are complex and concerned not only the political sphere but also basic needs that are satisfied
 - Conservatives Individuals are in general personality wise anxious about change, believe in the way things are / the order things are are good
 - Liberals in general want to control/change the future and their destiny actively. This appeals to personalities which are open minded.
- These things are predispositions/correlations, but not explain everything

VL10 Political Misperceptions and Accountability

The questions of today's lecture

- I. Why are misperceptions problematic for democracy?
- II. How widespread are these misperceptions?
- III. How can we understand their origins?

Why are misperceptions problematic for democracy?

- Three functions of elections /electoral democracies
 - o Holding elites accountable and the circulation of elites
 - o Policy signalling: in what direction should the country be moving?
 - o Legitimation of power
- The Role of the Mass Public
 - o **Political perception:** How do citizens view political reality? These are not always the same.
 - Crucial for **accountability** to know whether to “throw the rascals out” one has to know how they performed to evaluate their work.
 - Crucial for **policy-signaling**: Issue/ideological voting requires an accurate sense of where the parties stand to make a profound decision.
 - Crucial for **legitimacy**: One needs to accept election outcomes
- Alternative Facts
 - o We live in a world of alt-facts and therefore, fundamental disagreements about (political) reality
 - o Political disagreement should be about **Values, Priorities and Solutions** but now it is about the nature of reality itself.

How widespread are these misperceptions?

- These perceptions are widespread. Even there were there is a lot of evidence it is hard to change perceptions.
 - o Example: a survey was done where the people were asked how many people out of 100 are Muslim?
 - In all the observed countries the discrepancy was too high, and in some countries such as France or Belgium it was very high (31/100 was guess and in fact the answer is 8/100 in France)
 - o Example: Weapons of Mass destruction in Iraq. People were asked if they think that weapons of mass destruction were in Iraq in 2003 in a year where it was clear, that this was not the case.
 - Viewers of different news outlets gave different answers and over 50% of Fox news viewers thought it was true. This is also the case for 50% of Republican voters and over 30% of Democrats.
 - o Example Cont'd on crime in the US:
 - People think that crime rates are quite high and think that crime becomes more prevalent. But the reality is that crime was on the decline.
 - o Example on the relationship between vaccines and autism (which does not exist)
 - In India 44% of people believe this and in many other countries the values are also high. This becomes a political issue due to the forming anti-vaccine movement.
 - o Example about partisan difference (VL8?) Reagan and Clinton

- Example: Who won the elections in the US? Reuters-IPSOS
 - 2016 52% of Democrats believed Trump legitimately won the election
 - 2020 26% of Republicans believe Biden legitimately won the election
 - Democracy in trouble!

How can we understand their origins?

Individual-Level Theories

- **Lack of political sophistication:** People don't know a lot about politics or science, and they don't know a lot about evidence. This explanation is not really a plausible one. There seems to be more than education that matters. There seems to be a motivational component. The following two theories consider motivation as a factor.
- **Balance Theory:** Cognitive
 - Heider (1946) P = person (e.g., voter) O = other (e.g., politician) X = object (e.g., issue)
 - Links are affectively laden perceptions
 - Balance exists when the product of the affective charges is positive
 - **Assumption:** People are motivated to retain balance/coherence and restore it if necessary. The belief system of a person is driven by relations between person, other and object. These relations can be positive or negative and the product of the relations has to be a positive one for balance/coherence.
 - **Three pathways to balance:** Issue voting, Persuasion and Projection
 - **Issue voting:** what is my perception of the party?
 - I favour gun control (P-X = +)
 - the party opposes gun control (O-X = -)
 - To get a positive product I need an extra negative factor.
Conclusion: I dislike the party (P-O = -)
 - **Persuasion:** what is my perception on the issue?
 - I like the party (P-O = +)
 - The party opposes gun control (O-X = -)
 - Conclusion: I oppose gun control (P-X = -)
 - **Projection:** What is the party's view on the issue? This could lead to misperceptions
 - I like the party (P-O = +)
 - I favour gun control (P-X = +)
 - Conclusion: The party must favour gun control (O-X = +)
 - Three Variants of Projection
 - **Contrast:** P-O is negative. Therefore, you tend to place O further away on X than it really is
 - **Assimilation:** P-O is positive. Therefore, you tend to place O closer on X than it really is
- **Hot cognition:** Affective, about emotion
 - **In general:** Beliefs are sometimes held with great conviction
 - People have an emotional stake in it
 - It partially defines who they are
 - The stake triggers a motivation to retain the belief. This, in turn, affects subsequent information processing.
 - In comparison with the balance theory, which states that we try to balance any belief we have, this theory says that only the beliefs we really care about matter. The other beliefs are cold cognitions and not relevant for this

- **Two kinds of Motivations** can be triggered with hot cognitions. This is called motivated reasoning and have a certain automaticity. This means that they happen so fast that we can't intervene actively.
 - **Accuracy:** wanting to get it right
 - Information Acquisition and Processing happen unbiased
 - Information Integration happens inclusive
 - **Partisanship:** wanting to protect one's beliefs
 - Information Acquisition and Processing happens biased
 - Confirmation bias (Avoiding disconfirming information)
 - Disconfirmation bias (discount and counter arguing)
 - Information integration happens selective
 - Is there even a third bias?
 - **Validity effect or illusory truth effect:** If a false statement is repeated often enough, people start to believe its validity. E.g. Legitimacy of the vote and fraud by the democrats.
- **Kaplan et al. 2016:** study about automaticity, where they analysed different political and non-political beliefs. He had a sample of Liberals.
 - Neural Substrates: Process of being challenged is a deeply affective one. Therefore, it is all about emotion.
- **Conclusion:**
 - Effects are much weaker for people who are ambivalent. There is much more belief change but also much cooler cognition.
 - Not all emotions are equal: there are three classes
 - Anger—biased processing
 - Anxiety—unbiased processing
 - **Markus et al: Affective Intelligence** They differ between two systems. We all have an idea of how the (political) world should function. As long as everything goes the way we want it to the disposition system is in place. When reality strongly deviates from our ideas/script then the surveillance system comes to place and people start to evaluate less biased due to anxiety.
 - **Disposition System:** Is about habits
 - Situation matches script and habits drive behaviour
 - Enthusiasm and anger
 - **Surveillance system:** about variety of these habits
 - Situation differs from script & Information drives behaviour
 - Anxiety

Meso- and Macro-Level Theories

- The Supply-Side of Bias:
 - Politicians often fuel misperceptions through prevarication and lies.
 - Benefits of lying often outweigh costs. And doubling down on lies is common.
- The mass media
 - Partisan press, Both-side-ism, Horserace journalism
- The Social Media
 - The Social Media Often serve as echo-chambers.
 - Often propagate untruths quickly and without check.
 - However, can also be put to good use: Mobilization & Discussion and deliberation

VL11 Populism and representation

Linking course topics

- **The formation and transformation of West European party systems** (weeks 2, 6, and 7)
 - From state-market and religious-secular to the new cultural divide
 - Social movements
- **Identities and groups (week 8)**
 - The micro-foundations of group formation. How are group attachments formed on the level of the individual?
- **Personality and political ideology (week 9)**
 - Ideology: issue bundles – value change – psychological needs
 - Personality traits and right-wing authoritarianism
 - The liberal-conservative divide
 - Big-5: Openness vs. conscientiousness and neuroticism
 - Right-wing authoritarianism
 - Universalism-traditionalism/authoritarianism/ communitarianism divide in Europe as a variant. For the exam it is not essential which term is used.
- **Perceptions and accountability (week 10)**
 - Policy signalling is done by choosing and voting out elites
 - Misperception as a problem
- **Representation (today)**
 - Idea of representation: Responsiveness of governments to citizens' policy preferences. This is a key element of democracy (Dahl 1971)
 - If most people misperceive the policy outcomes representation is difficult to legitimize. But this is not the case.
- **Responsiveness to policy preferences (context and linkage)**
 - Parties should mirror the attitudes and preferences of their voters. Therefore, we are going to make the link between the vote choice and attitudes of individuals.
 - To link this with the cleavage theory, we look beyond these issues because issue preferences are rooted in social divisions and group identities. They are important to shape these durable alignments.

Programmatic representation

- **Pitkin (1967): Models of representation** (3 types of representation)
 - 1. Descriptive representation
 - Idea: Similar demography, similar interests
 - This is an unreliable proxy for policy preferences.
 - E.g. working-class members are represented by working-class members
 - 2. Symbolic representation
 - Next week: Charismatic linkage
 - It is similar to descriptive representation, but here it is more about the person
 - This is an unreliable proxy for policy preferences.
 - Both unreliable proxies for policy preferences!
 - 3. "Representing people who have interests": policy representation
 - Requires programmatic linkages (next week)
 - Modern and complex approach

- **APSA 1950 & Thomassen 1994: Responsible party government –**
- the conditions for policy representation
 - People have informed political preferences
 - Parties offer distinct policy options
 - Voters can choose which party best represents their preferences
 - Lecture on social movements: Perhaps none of the parties does!
 - These perceptions of parties' positions guide voting decisions
 - And not populism, charisma, clientelism or other non-programmatic linkages. If these are the case, we don't have the conditions for the responsible party government.
 - Balance theory (last week): Achieving balance
- Implementation of this model empirically
 - People have informed political preferences:
 - can be studied with Mass-level survey data
 - Parties offer distinct policy options:
 - Can be studied with Elite data
 - These perceptions of parties' positions guide voting decisions:
 - Can be studied with the match between party positions and voter preferences (data of the two previous points).
 - If voter's preferences align with the party positions there is a high congruence/responsiveness
 - But what (single) issues or dimensions?
 - Cleavage approach (weeks 3, 7, 8) focusses on dimensions and not on single issues
- **Polarization and representation in Switzerland 1975-2011**
- Measurement
 - Party positions as revealed in campaigns
 - (POLCON project, <https://www.eui.eu/Projects/POLCON>)
 - Here statements of parties in the news media were coded. This way we get an image of the public perception of parties. There is a focus on what voters learn about party positions
 - Voter preferences measured using election studies
 - (SELECTS, <https://forscenter.ch/projects/selects/>)
 - Issue attitudes measured after election
 - Aggregated into ideological dimensions that reflect cleavages
- Results
 - Dimensions in the Swiss party system, the example of the 2003 elections
 - Elite data from the news media shows that the political space in Switzerland is structured by these cleavage dimensions (cultural and economical)
 - The new left (GPS), the social democrats (SP) are close to cultural liberalism and European Integration
 - The New Right (SVP) is positioned on the other end of this pole
 - The mainstream right is somewhere in the middle
 - The transformation of the cultural dimension 1975-1995
 - **1975:** the liberals misrepresent their voters, because their attitudes are too much on the cultural dimension for their centrist voters. In this year there is no party yet, which really represents the authoritarian pole of the cultural dimension. The SVP is more or less in the middle of this dimension.

- **1995:** The voters still align in the same order, but they spread out on the cultural dimension. But there has been a change in party positions. The SVP now starts campaigning issues of the authoritarian pole (esp. opposition of immigration and European integration). Therefore, there is now an opposition to the new left (GPS).
- Shifting positions of the mainstream right
 - The FDP and CVP had more libertarian views on the cultural dimension than their voters in 1975. Therefore, they shifted more into the centre and now better represent their electorate.
- Measuring responsiveness
 - In 1975 there is a lot of misrepresentation. This changes in the year 1995, where the responsiveness is much better. Therefore, party positions have become more polarized over time and the responsiveness has improved.

The ambivalent role of polarization

- Problematic aspects of Polarization
 - Parties may be more extreme than voters in the Swiss case (Leimgruber, Hangartner, and Leemann 2010) and in the US (Fiorina and Abrams 2008)
 - Less of a problem in a consensus democracy?
 - Policy making and finding compromise
 - Difficulty of forging legislative coalitions in Switzerland (Traber 2015)
 - Polarization around cultural issues driven by parties that put into question liberal aspects of democracy
 - Especially the case with populist radical right parties in systems where they have power
- Beneficial aspects of Polarization
 - Polarization clarifies policy alternatives
 - Precondition for the responsible party model
 - Drives out non-programmatic linkages (next week)
 - Increases turnout: e.g. Switzerland and US
 - In the course of growing polarization, more people turnout to vote than before. In Switzerland this was the case since the rise of the SVP in the mid 1990's.

The role of populism

- What is populism?
 - Populism as a "(thin) ideology" (e.g., Mudde 2004, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017) with 3 elements
 - People-centrist – idea of *volonté générale*
 - Anti-elitism – idea of the betrayed people
 - Manichean outlook – idea of good and evil, elite and people
 - Characteristic of political discourse
 - Radical populist right parties (including Swiss People's Party SVP)
 - Some radical left parties (La France Insoumise, but less so Die Linke)
 - Populism as an attitude at the mass level?

- Proposal for a **measurement instrument (Castanho Silva et al. 2018)**
 - People-centrism:
 - Ppl1. Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the people.
 - Ppl2. Politicians don't have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job.*
 - Ppl3. The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country's politics.
 - Anti-elitism:
 - Ant1. The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.
 - Ant2. Government officials use their power to try to improve people's lives.*
 - Ant3. Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked.
 - Manichaeian outlook:
 - Man1. You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics.
 - Man2. The people I disagree with politically are not evil.*
 - Man3. The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed.
- Roots of Populism
 - Personality (week 9)
 - Negative correlation with agreeableness
 - Neuroticism (anxiety) might depend on the context
 - Emotions
 - Anger, not fear as a more important trait (Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza 2017)
- Populism and representation
 - Populist predispositions are widespread, but they need to be activated
 - Populist attitudes → activation → voting behaviour
 - What does it take?
 - A strong representation deficit for populist predispositions to be activated (e.g. 1975 in Switzerland where the authoritarian pole of the cultural dimension was not represented)
 - A challenger that employs populist rhetoric

Interview with Steven Van Hauwaert

- On his 2018 article (co-authored with Stijn van Kessel) Beyond protest and discontent: A crossnational analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support. European Journal of Political Research, 57(1), 68–92. [https:// doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12216](https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12216)

VL12 Non-programmatic linkages and representation

Recap about accountability

- Definition of accountability:
 - o **Voters signal preferences**
 - o **Voters can hold politicians responsible:** politicians need to explain themselves to the voter and they need to explain what they did when they were in office.
 - o **Voters can sanction politicians** (remove them)
- But what kind of preferences?
 - o So far, we only talked about Policy preferences but these preferences can be more divers as we will see in today's lecture (linkages?)

Three types of linkages (Kitschelt 2000)

- **Programmatic** linkages: Based on policies offered by parties
 - o Responsible party model
 - o Policy preferences we talked about in week 11
- **Clientelistic** linkages: Selective incentives offered by politicians or parties
 - o Brusco et al. (2004): Vote-buying as a specific form (e.g. in Argentina)
- **Charismatic** linkages: Personalistic appeals of a politician
 - o Symbolic representation (Pitkin 1967, last week)
 - o A person impersonates/incarnates a certain group of voters

Clientelistic linkages

- Different forms of benefits
 - o Material benefits (vote buying)
 - o Patronage:
 - Parties provide public jobs to brokers (local politicians who act on behalf of the party are rewarded with a public job)
 - Brokers provide clients with access to public goods, social policy, etc. (e.g. in many democracies you need a local politician to help you/talk to the administration (even if you are entitled to receive social policies) because without them/this spokesperson you wouldn't receive it)
- Conditionality distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic politics
 - o You only get the benefit if you vote for a certain party
 - o This requires monitoring
- **Stokes et al. 2013: Conditionality as the central feature of clientelism**





FIGURE 1.1. A Conceptual Scheme of Distributive Politics.

- **Scherlis (2008): the clientelistic pyramid**



- **Clientelistic exchange:** local leaders provide jobs to brokers (Vermittler), who are central in this clientelistic approach. They are the key agents who distribute the benefits to the voters/clients in exchange for electoral support (symbolic at a rally or for a vote etc.).
 - Monitoring is central to this approach: How can parties make sure that this works?
- **The central role of monitoring in clientelistic exchanges**
 - **Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes (2004) on monitoring on the individual level:** they offer three explanations for the question (on the individual level): What drives voters to comply with the clientelistic deal?
 - 1. **“Probabilistic selective incentives”:** Compliance in order to secure resources in the future (that they have in the moment but are afraid to lose). Compliance seems to be stronger in rural areas, where the observation is easier. This is the most likely reason among the three. This is a rational choice explanation.
 - 2. **Norms:** Receiving a benefit creates an obligation. People are thankful and feel as if they need to give the people something back for the benefit they received. Evidence shows that this explanation is not so likely, because this perception is more common among richer voters, who are not as affected by such clientelistic benefits as the poorer voters. This is a cultural explanation.
 - 3. **Discounting the future:** People do not believe in policy programs at all. But here there is also evidence that this effect is not really the case.
 - **Ames (1995) on monitoring on the aggregate level:** Here monitoring happens by indirect observation through partisan and social networks (example Brazil)
 - The election results are known, and politicians can look which districts voted for them and can then allocate their resources to them (e.g. access to water supply or electricity which are benefits on a group level).

- **Implications of clientelism**

- Central role for brokers: All politics is local
 - The fact that all politics are local, and many people don't really have an idea of national politics. This impedes Cleavage-formation from happening.
 - As Lipset & Rokkan (1967) state: An Ideological conflict is cross-local or "functional". Being a member of the working class or a religious group has nothing to do with local politics. (week)
- Therefore, National parties do not represent voters' policy preferences
 - Policy preferences are not essential for a voter's decision. Other things on the local level are more important as we have seen.
 - This **Violates key democratic principles** (
 - Definition of a democracy by Dahl: Policy preferences/demands should be met in a democracy and the voters should be responsible for the political agenda. Furthermore, voters need an enlightened understanding of (national) politics.
 - **Grievances create potentials for populism and charismatic leaders**
 - When grievances come up in a system with programmatic politics, the people can vote for the party which focusses on these issues
 - In a non-programmatic system this is not possible. It gets even more problematic when resources dry out due to an economic crisis. This creates a great potential for populism and charismatic leaders.

Brusco, Nazarreno, and Stokes (2004): The case of Argentina

- All three linkage strategies are present (clientelism, programs, charisma)
- Clientelism used to compensate losers of market liberalization:
 - In the 1980's and 90's there was a big liberalization movement in Latin America, which meant a lot of poor voters and workers in the informal sector had big losses. Therefore, parties shifted to a strategy where they focussed on certain sectors of the electorate in clientelistic means.
 - Informal sector workers & Poor voters especially affected
- Programmatic divide dating back to 1940s
 - Sectoral cleavage: **Agricultural exporters (meat producers) vs industrial sector**. This cleavage corresponds with Lipset and Rokkan's (1967): primary-secondary sector
 - This cleavage is durable, because it is rooted in the countries economic structure and the social groups, which are situated in that structure.
 - Agricultural exporters are for economic liberalism and the industrial sector is for economic protectionism
 - **Juan Domino Perón** played a key role in this cleavage
 - He became labour minister in military government in 1943: This were times of economic crisis.
 - **Strong measures in favour of working class**: unionization, wage increases, full employment. Therefore, he was very popular among the working class. There was also strong opposition from within the government, which tried to impeach him. This was followed by a big spontaneous mass mobilization of Perón's followers. This was essential for this cleavage to come about.
 - In 1946 Perón won the elections.
 - Development of the "charismatic bond" (Madsen and Snow 1991)

- **Madsen and Snow (1991): The charismatic bond**
 - Charisma defined as influence or persuasion (—> week 10):
“(…) an influence relationship marked by asymmetry, directness, and, for the follower, great passion. Asymmetry means that the leader has profound influence on attitudes and behaviour of the following but that the opposite is not true” (Madsen & Snow 1991: 5).
 - Describes the aspect of symbolic representation
 - Related to the concepts of
 - Persuasion
 - Projection: assimilation and the contrast which is polarization (anti-Peronist camp)
 - **The role of crisis:** negative effect on Self-efficacy (capacity to deal with challenges). Therefore, it gives way to proxy control (giving somebody else control).
 - This provokes positive feelings in the people, because they are relieved from this pressure.
 - Two types of Peronist voters
 - Voters in small towns, migrants: mobilization through charismatic linkage
 - Programmatic linkages among working class: From charisma to organization
 - Charismatic mobilization can result in enduring cleavages
 - Different types of linkages/cleavages are prevalent at the same time in Argentina.

How does charismatic leadership relate to Populism?

- **Charisma:** A strategy of mobilization, focussed on an individual
 - Persuasion
 - Situations in which order breaks down and people are looking for orientation
 - **Populism:** An ideology – the pure people against the corrupt elite
 - Strategy used by political outsiders
 - Key difference to charisma is that it mirrors mass-level populist attitudes
 - On the individual/emotional level mostly anger is associated with populist voting
- ➔ Both are compatible with different ideologies

The case of Venezuela: Linkages and programmatic representation: The election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela

- Predominance of clientelism in Venezuela’s party system until Hugo Chávez came about, 1958-1998
 - In the 1990’s there was an economic crisis due to falling oil prices and neoliberal policies, which were implemented by the previous governments. At the time the opposition parties did not really provide an alternative to the old parties, which had become indistinguishable by the time.
 - Therefore, there was weak representation in Venezuela prior to Chávez’ candidacy
 - Both traditional parties were quite centrist
 - The left-wing parties did not provide a credible alternative
 - Between the party’s position and the position of the voters there is profound misrepresentation.
- ➔ This provided the situation for somebody with credible left-wing program to appear

- Chávez elected president in 1998
 - Promises “Socialism of the 21st Century”
 - Movement for the Fifth Republic (MVR, later PSUV) was the party he founded
 - He had a left-wing program, but he mobilized as an opposition candidate against the political establishment
 - He is one of the most populist politicians in many datasets
 - His left-wing positions did not really matter for the persons who supported him. The positions of his voters were mostly centrist and quite widely distributed on the political axis.
 - Populism seems to have played the most important role in this case
 - Here populism did not result in an enduring cleavage and did not improve representation unlike in Argentina or in Bolivia.
 - Nicolás Maduro elected successor in 2013

Understanding clientelism: three large approaches in political science

- **General questions**
 - Who is targeted and why do they sell their votes?
 - How do we explain differences between parties and countries?
- **Culturalism:**
 - Question: Who is targeted and why do they sell their votes?
 - Clientelism may not be seen as wrong normatively, politics are just that way
 - **Depends on political sophistication:** Understanding what national politics are about and understanding that there is a discrepancy between what the local politicians are talking about and the national politics.
 - **Low-income voters may not see programmatic goods as an alternative.** Benefits they receive from clientelistic parties are more interesting to them.
 - **Auyero (2001): Ethnographic study on Peronist networks in Argentina**
 - Development reduces importance of clientelism
 - Middle-class voters dislike clientelism (Weitz-Shapiro 2014)
- **Rationality:**
 - Who is targeted and why do they sell their votes?
 - Dependence on clientelistic resources
 - “Functional equivalent to the welfare state” (Kitschelt 2000): The welfare state prevents such clientelistic structures from being set in place.
 - Lower-income voters mainly targeted (Brusco et al. 2004)
 - How to overcome clientelism?
 - Party side: Development makes clientelism more costly
 - Parties shift to programmatic goods, because it becomes too costly at a certain point
 - But: “Politician’s dilemma” – parties forced to pursue short-term strategies in the light of the next elections (Geddes 1994)
 - Quantitative evidence from Kitschelt & Kselman (2013)
 - Relationship between development (GDP) and clientelistic strategies of parties. In very poorly developed countries Clientelism is not really important. It gets more important with rising development levels and rising


competition. With further development it becomes less prevalent because it gets too expensive for parties to follow this strategy.

- The more developed a country becomes, the more prevalent programmatic politics becomes
- Maybe there is also value change taking place with further development (cultural argument)

- **Structuralism:** specifically, historical institutionalism shaped by Shefter (1977):

- Even the middle class may expect clientelistic goods (culturalism)
 - How can this situation be overcome?
 - Europe and the US were also very clientelistic in the past
- There are two paths to programmatic politics:
 - **Universalistic bureaucracies:**
 - **Key question:** Do parties have access to state resources?
 - First path to programmatic politics explains differences between countries. Some have bureaucracies that don't allow individual parties to interfere in the process and grant voter's resources.
 - This is only the case in some countries, where the bureaucracy has not been politicised through the process of mass politics.
 - **Ideological parties (Shefter 1977)**
 - More dynamic perspective which explains how party systems can become more programmatic.
 - **Bottom-up organized parties** can rely only on ideology, because at the time they did not have state resources to use and therefore, could only mobilize through ideology
 - E.g. Historical mobilization of the left in Europe, which is largely responsible for this shift away from clientelistic politics in Europe.
 - This creates persistent differences between parties
 - Role of ideological polarization
 - Can also be observed in Latin America: countries which are more ideologically polarized show less clientelistic politics

The funnel of causality: Arranging course topics



Economic structure and Social divisions

- VL 2,6,7
- Industrialization has e.g resulted in classes and cleavages
- Nationbuilding (urban vs rural etc)

Party mobilization and Networks (outside of the funnel)

- Party mobilization: Help to explain the durability of cleavages and the durable alignments
 - o Parties play an important role in mobilizing
 - o With polarization it is easier to see the differences
- Networks:
 - o Social psychology: the more you interact with likeminded people the more closure there is
- Group identity (VL8)
 - o Reinforced
 - o People don't change their identity quickly – durability of cleavages
 - o Individual level: perspective of psychological needs which then lead to processes such as ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation
 - Group conflict beyond the existing cleavages can be explained like this
 - How to overcome was also discussed
- Value orientations (VL3)
 - o Emancipatory values and value change / modernization
 - o Universalistic values vs traditionalism/communitarism (has directly been mobilized)

- Party attachment (or an ideological block e.g. in CH)
- Ideology
 - E.g. Rokeach and the classical ideologies of the 20th century regarding equality and freedom
 - Ideology as a bundle of preferences
 - Ideology as a consequence of psychological needs
- Attitudes towards issues (VL5)
 - More specific views on policies
 - Derive from different sources such as values, interests, identities etc.
 - Very close to behaviour now
 - In political science we always assume that people have clear attitudes, but that might not be the case
 - Not informed and not interested (might make them susceptible to campaigning)
 - Not ignorant, but there are conflicting attitudes (e.g. self-interest vs group identity in environmental issues) also conflicting values are possible
 - Ambivalence,
 - Campaigns might help to preference certain attitudes
 - Intermediate variables need to be taken into consideration
 - To some degree psychological predispositions can have an influence
- Vote (VL11)
 - Responsible Party model: where do parties stand and where do voters stand? Is there a match?
- Accountability
 - Behaviour can have different purposes e.g.
 - Mechanism mostly works, might go wrong (VL misconceptions)
- Personality
 - Are certain parties drawn to a certain kind of party?
- Clientelism
 - Attitudes towards issues do not matter, if you want to receive benefits this is particularistic
 - It might have to do with candidates
 - Distribution of gifts might be targeted at certain groups e.g. the poor
 - Also, historical patterns matter
 - Group identities of the poor who are in need can be a factor of social identity
 - Might be a quite durable
- Charisma
 - A certain political figure stands for a certain group
 - Symbolic representation
 - Can in the long run result in a programmatic cleavage
 - Crisis situation makes people more susceptible for charismatic / populist figures
- Populism
 - Is an enabling feature
 - But Often more substantive ideologies drive people to vote for these parties
 - A small share of people is centrist, but is drawn to populist parties because of their anti-establishment pro people ideology

The outcome / the vote choice

- Many of these factors which decide whether or who you vote are also relevant for the mobilization of social movements. There it is also a choice you make to participate or not.
 - Can be rooted to social divisions etc. sociological factors
 - Similar views on issues of the group e.g.
 - Collective action frame: campaigning for the movement, giving meaning to an issue or making salient
 - Resources model: emphasises networks, which help to diffuse the collective action frame
 - Also parties can play into reinforcing movements
 - USA cultural dimension important in the civil rights movements
 - Democratic party took this position for the movements
 - Cleavage in party system and in society

The big theoretical frameworks

Rational choice:

- Focusses mainly on what happens at the end of the funnel of causality
 - Attitudes, issues etc.
 - Economic conditions not so important, that's why we didn't talk about this in the course

Culturalism

- Focusses on value orientations and economic structure and their historical patterns
- It is not so much about conflict and social division
 - This is more the case in structuralism

Structuralism

- Thinking of politics in groups and not individuals
 - Idea that people think alike in the same group
 - Therefore, it takes parties to mobilize you and networks in making you feel like belonging to a certain block
 - How a person acts politically is shaped by its social division
 - People don't make up their mind individually but in the discourse with others

Political psychology

- Individualistic decisionmaking
- Rational behaviour is one type of behaviour among many
 - Attitudes, values, issues, preferences etc.
 - Rational choice only attitudes and preferences
- Micro level e.g. with neuroscience und soo